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We demonstrate how the 5G network slicing model can be extended to address data security require-
ments. In this work we demonstrate two different slice configurations, with different encryption require-
ments, representing two diverse use-cases for 5G networking namely, an enterprise application hosted at a
metro network site, and a content delivery network.
We create a modified software-defined networking (SDN) orchestrator which calculates and provisions
network slices according to the requirements, including encryption backed by quantum key distribution
(QKD), or other methods. Slices are automatically provisioned by SDN orchestration of network resources,
allowing selection of encrypted links as appropriate, including those which use standard Diffie-Hellman
key exchange, QKD and quantum-resistant algorithms (QRAs), as well as no encryption at all. We show that
the set-up and tear-down times of the network slices takes of the order of 1-2 minutes, which is an order of
magnitude improvement over manually provisioning a link today.
1 Introduction
The recent introduction of 5G networks for commer-
cial use promises to deliver increased bandwidth
to customers, enabling faster speed connections, as
well as lower-latency communications, the ability to
meet Quality of Service demands, and many other
service improvements. This opens up the possibil-
ity for far greater connectivity of devices than ever
before.
The benefits brought by 5G are as a result of the
converged architecture, which is the core of 5G net-
works; resources are placed as close to the edge of
the network as possible (i.e. as far away from the
core network as can be), thus offering lower-latency
services via so-called edge-computing [1]. Taking
advantage of the edge-located resources and the fact
that these resources are used more efficiently (with
some sharing of compute resource, for example) are
use-cases such as content delivery networks (CDNs)
and edge-compute, automated vehicles and remote
operations, as well as the monitoring and control of
large-scale Internet of Things (IoT) networks, such
as smart meters and distributed power generation.
Due to the fact that there are a wide variety of
new use-cases which are enabled by 5G technology,
the network has had to be designed such that it can
cope with this range of heterogeneous requirements,
such as latency, reliability, security, and more [2].
Consequently, network slicing is utilised, and plays
a key role within making 5G networks suitably flex-
ible [3].
By effectively multiplexing separate virtualised
networks over common physical infrastructure, net-
work slices are made, and can be provisioned differ-
ent resources. For example, a network slice provid-
ing communications for an automated vehicle will
require very low latency, but a fairly low bandwidth,
compared to high-definition video streaming which
is more reliant on large bandwidth and less on la-
tency [4]. Both of these use-cases can be delivered on
the same physical infrastructure by separating these
into separate virtualised networks through network
slicing.
Network slicing is reliant on software-defined
networking (SDN) and network functions virtuali-
sation (NFV). NFV allows network slices to be made
via virtual machines (VMs), which are then con-
nected together across the network via SDN orches-
tration [5]; SDN is used to flexibly configure net-
work slices, as well as reserving resources for the
wide range of use-cases possible via orchestration
carried about by a network slice controller (as illus-
trated in Fig. 1). This SDN orchestration is vital
within this work, as it is used to dynamically control
the type of encryption deployed for each network
slice.
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Figure 1: A generic schematic to illustrate network slicing, orchestrated by a network slice controller within an exemplar 5G network.
In general, however, 5G networking does not
usually intrinsically provide encryption of data traf-
fic, instead relying on over-the-top encrypted ses-
sions (such as TLS) often placing a responsibility
on the end user to maintain security updates. [5].
End-to-end security will always require encryption
at the user equipment, of course, but 5G networks
involve critical links within the tiered resources over
which large concentrations of secure application
traffic may flow, such as between the aggregation
and metro nodes. These critical links could be very
attractive targets for eavesdroppers; and so we sug-
gest that network operators consider providing en-
cryption for these links.
A vital prerequisite for strong encryption is se-
cure key exchange. Todays standard key exchange
algorithms (such as Diffie-Hellman and RSA) are
thought to be vulnerable to attacks by large-scale
quantum computers. As such, there are two possi-
ble routes for avoiding this future threat: quantum-
resistant algorithms (QRAs), such as those being de-
veloped under the NIST program [6], and quantum
key distribution (QKD).
Whereas QRAs for key exchange would be re-
liant on strong mathematical proofs to safeguard
against the increased compute power of a large-
scale quantum computer, QKD is based upon the
fundamental laws of quantum physics, and if imple-
mented properly is secure against any future com-
putational threat. QKD utilises quantum states en-
coded on photons to agree a key between users with
information theoretic security (ITS). ITS implies that
we are able to calculate the statistical likelihood that
an eavesdropper holds any information on the key,
and show that this has been reduced to an infinites-
imally small probability. We emphasise that QKD is
secure against any future computational threat, be
that classical or quantum, whereas QRAs may be in-
secure against a future quantum hacking algorithm,
which is yet to be discovered.
QKD requires an initial authentication step,
which is straightforward where pre-shared key ex-
ists, but if this is not the case then QRAs may be
needed for this first-time authentication. Moreover,
if a QRA is used for the initial authentication step,
once QKD has been performed it does not then
matter if the QRA is subsequently broken, because
the QKD key material has no algorithmic link to
the QRA material that was used to authenticate the
QKD exchange.
To protect data for which there is a need for pri-
vacy or intellectual property retention over a time-
scale of years, we anticipate that network applica-
tion designers will select QRAs. However, for the
most valuable and/or sensitive data, further long-
term key security can be provided by QKD, in con-
junction with QRAs for encryption and authentica-
tion. 5G networks have the capability to dynami-
cally control the type of encryption used for sepa-
rate data channels.
Sections of a single network slice may have dif-
ferent security requirements, for example where
data is time sensitive and cached within the net-
work, such as CDNs, or where data from multiple
devices is aggregated; the level of security is another
parameter of the connection which it would be use-
ful to be able to control as part of a network slice.
Using network slicing to control encryption is
relatively novel, but nevertheless has already been
considered theoretically in [7] and [8] by utilising
QKD in tandem with a QRA (specifically, a QRA
version of Elliptic-Curve Cryptography), and has
also performed experimentally over the Bristol City
5G UK Test Network in the works of [9–11], by
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applying QKD to 5G networking. Moreover, in
[12], proof-of-transit of the 5G data traffic is demon-
strated, using cryptographic techniques with QKD
over the Madrid Quantum Network [13] this net-
work has also been used to demonstrate securing
the management of the SDN control plane through
QKD in [14, 15].
However, what differentiates our work is that we
dynamically control the type of encryption Diffie-
Hellman-AES, QRA-AES, QKD-AES, or no encryp-
tion at all to address the realistic scenario in which
different data packets in a 5G network will have
varying security requirements. We note here that
the symmetric encryption algorithm used in this
work is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
with 256 bit keys, from QKD, Diffie-Hellman or a
QRA. AES is currently thought to be ”quantum-
safe”, in that even a large-scale quantum computer
will be unable to crack this method of encryp-
tion with an exponential speed-up, unlike Diffie-
Hellman or RSA asymmetric algorithms used to es-
tablish shared secret keys which are susceptible to
this type of cryptanalysis.
Within this work we experimentally demon-
strate 5G network slicing to dynamically control the
type of encryption (and therefore the level of data
security) over existing commercial telecommunica-
tions infrastructure, to represent the possibility of
supporting the variety of potential new use-cases
born through 5G networks, which will inevitably
have diverse security requirements. More specifi-
cally, we experimentally simulate two potential use-
cases an enterprise application hosted at a metro
site in the network, and a CDN use-case.
This paper is organised as follows: in Section
2 we describe our 5G network topology and de-
sign, and methodology behind our proof of con-
cept demonstration, before discussing the results in
Section 3. Section 3 is divided into subsections in
which we first address the two network slice con-
figurations separately (Subsections 3.1 and 3.2), be-
fore moving to present results regarding the tim-
ing (namely the provision and deprovision times) of
each network slice in Subsection 3.3.
2 Methodology
Within this section we discuss the methodology
used behind the test-bed configuration of our
5G network slicing prototype, with dynamically-
controlled encryption.
Fig. 2 schematically describes the architecture
of the representative network test-bed used within
this work. There are four node types in this network
cell, aggregation, metro, and core. Traffic flows from
the cell sites to the core site, via use of Ethernet
switches and optical switches. In reality such an ex-
emplar network would likely be located as per Fig.
5, in which the two cell sites could be Felixstowe and
Woodbridge, with the aggregation site in Ipswich,
the metro site in Cambridge, and the core node in
London.
However, in this work we use the UKQNtel in-
frastructure, which is a section of the UK Quantum
Network, containing intermediate trusted nodes for
QKD link handover and classical amplification (for
further detail, see [16]), as this has QKD-capable net-
working over a 121 km link from BT Research Labs
in Ipswich (Adastral Park) to Cambridge. Avail-
able for interconnections over this infrastructure
are 5×100G channels on a coherent dense wave-
division multiplexing (DWDM) system looped back
over the 121 km optical fibre link (242 km in total
see Fig. 2).
Each of the five 100G channels within this link
provides 10×10G client Ethernet ports, and all in-
terconnections between 5G network sites are 10G.
There is no segregation of encryption between 10G
clients on the same 100G channel (one encryption
key per 100G channel, refreshed at 3s intervals).
In other implementations it might be preferred to
have a separate encryption key per client port, but
this would not affect the Network Slicing Orches-
trator approach demonstrated here. Three channels
are configured to provide: no encryption; standard
Diffie-Hellman with Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (DH-AES); a prototype QRA, specifically an
NTRU implementation provided by the OpenQuan-
tumSafe library [17], with AES (QRA-AES). The re-
maining two channels are in the default config-
uration for the UKQNtel link (256 bit AES, with
keys provided via QKD, referred to herein as QKD-
AES). Two exemplary network circuit schematics
are shown in Fig. 3 to illustrate the specific con-
nectivity between Adastral Park and Cambridge
with the various encryption schemes utilised in this
work.
The ADVA 10-TCE encryption cards that were
used for data transmission have two available mod-
els: one which supports encryption (10-TCE-AES,
see Fig. 3), and one which does not (10-TCE). The
resource limitations on encrypted links are there-
fore dependent on the hardware available. Simi-
larly, adding QKD to an encrypted link is limited
by available installed hardware, however, it may be
possible to route traffic which does not strictly re-
quire encryption over free encrypted links. The de-
lay introduced by the 10-TCE-AES is 15µs (4µs in
the card, and 11µs in the CFP module which applies
Forward Error Correction) - this figure is the same
for both the 10-TCE and 10-TCE-AES (encrypted)
card.
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Figure 2: The network test-bed configuration for the implementation of 5G network slicing, with varying levels of security provided.
Figure 3: Exemplary network diagrams to show the connectivity from the Adastral Park and Cambridge network nodes, illustrating
the use of various encryption methods: a) QKD-AES encryption, b) DH-AES or QRA-AES encryption. The wavelengths of the various
channels are denoted as follows: λMGMT = management wavelength, λDISC = QKD discussion channel wavelength, λQ = quantum key
transmission wavelength. OTN = optical transport network.
4
Figure 4: Two stages in the user journey for creating slices, highlighting the security specification: no encryption, DH-AES, QKD-AES or
Post-Quantum (referred to in-text as ”QRA-AES”). a) Selecting the sites, b) Configuring the security requirements for interconnections.
Figure 5: A representative view of how such a 5G network would be distributed: Cell Sites = Felixstowe and Woodbridge, Aggregation
Node = Ipswich, Metro Node = Cambridge, Core Node = London.
To demonstrate the ability of our orchestrator to
create very diverse network slice requirements we
added a further illustrative variation, namely be-
tween DH-AES and QRA-AES. However, in prac-
tice a network operator would likely select a net-
work policy which always applies one, or both, of
these techniques in addition to available QKD hard-
ware. We view the QKD-AES encrypted links as of-
fering the highest level of security, and note that in
some implementations, since the main extra cost is
for the QKD hardware, these may be implemented
as QKD plus another method of key exchange in a
single link.
Central to this experiment is the use of SDN
control and orchestration technologies. All of the
network devices utilised within this demo have a
YANG device model, and their configuration can be
changed by issuing requests via a NETCONF inter-
face. Network devices are registered with a Cisco
Network Services Orchestrator (NSO) SDN Con-
troller, and the orchestrator communicates with the
SDN controller via a REST-API. Each slice is broken
down into three connections: cell site to core site (for
control plane traffic), cell site to compute site, and
compute site to core site. To achieve the required
network flexibility, Layer 2 (L2) switches are used at
each site. The optical switch at the metro site pro-
vides necessary flexibility for allocation of the links
with different security levels to different tasks.
This approach allows a network operator to
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Figure 6: Network configurations of a) Use-Case 1, representing an enterprise app hosted at a network metro site, and b) Use-Case 2,
representing a content delivery network (CDN), hosted at the network aggregation site.
specify the properties of the new network slice
required, through a portal or application pro-
grammable interface (API). The entity providing
this is a custom Network Slicing Orchestrator (see
Fig. 5), which we have created and modified to
include security requirements. The Network Slic-
ing Orchestrator has the full end-to-end view of the
network and understands the requirements for net-
work slices, as well as performing the routing and
resource allocation.
For each connection in a slice, the required se-
curity level (non-encrypted, DH-AES, QKD-AES or
QRA-AES is specified, along with more traditional
slice parameters such as bandwidth, latency and
compute requirements. The portal interface and the
slice requirement input screen showing the new se-
curity level options used in the experiment is shown
in Fig. 4b, and the site selection interface is shown
in Fig. 4a.
Once the properties for a slice are submitted, the
Network Slicing Orchestrator determines a suitable
route through the network and checks whether suf-
ficient network and compute resource are available,
whilst also ensuring that the links selected meet the
security requirements specified in the initial slice re-
quest. The NSO achieves this by allocating a secu-
rity metric to each link which then is used as part of
the path computation element. The network opera-
tor can then submit their request for the slice to be
activated and the orchestrator then issues the con-
figuration commands to the network devices.
3 Results & Discussion
We trialled two use-cases for 5G network slicing en-
cryption. Two slice configurations are shown in Fig.
6, based on use-cases, and in the following subsec-
tions we discuss the network topology of each use-
case separately before moving to present further re-
sults.
3.1 Use-Case 1: Enterprise App
Use-Case 1 is an enterprise app hosted at the metro
site. The enterprise app processes data coming from
user equipment (UE) which is connected to the cell
sites.
The link from each cell site to the metro site is
secured with post-quantum security via use of a
QRA, a solution which scales well. Premium QKD-
AES encryption is selected for the link which passes
aggregated data from the metro site to the mobile
core node; this could be a prime target for a ma-
licious eavesdropper, and therefore would benefit
the most from the highest level of data security.
Standard software-based key-exchange algorithms
(Diffie-Hellman) are chosen as sufficient to protect
the control plane, operating from the cell site to the
core site, which is considered to require only short-
lived security of encryption.
3.2 Use-Case 2: CDN
Use-Case 2 is a CDN, in which the delivery sites
are placed close to the network edge, at aggrega-
tion sites, in order to reduce the load within the
core of the network. The scenario is that sensitive
data (such as pre-released video content or software
packages) is delivered securely to the CDN, and an
eavesdropper would place high value in retrieving
this data ahead of the official release.
The delivery of the content to the CDN is via an
encrypted link based on QKD, while no encryption
is provisioned between the aggregation node and
the cell site, since after the data has been released it
no longer needs to be protected. Again, we deploy
standard DH-AES key exchange and encryption to
the control plane traffic, from the cell site to the core
site, as we did for Use-Case 1.
3.3 Timing
Fig. 7 shows histograms to quantify the time taken
to set-up (provision) and tear-down (deprovision)
the network slices, in both use-cases.
Fig. 7 shows that the distribution of times to
set-up and tear down each of the two slices is, in
each use-case, between 1 and 2 minutes. This is a
significant improvement, as it is orders of magni-
tude shorter than the time it takes to provision a
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link manually today, which is a benefit to telecom-
munications operators. In Use-Case 2 the slice takes
longer to provision/deprovision as it has an ad-
ditional network element to provision (namely, a
metro node Ethernet switch), which is not needed
in Use-Case 1.
Each network configuration step is made in se-
quence (see Wireshark trace, Fig. 8), allowing for
efficient roll-back if there is a problem. This sequen-
tial build-up of the slice increases the time taken to
set it up (there is no parallel allocation or configura-
tion of resources), but since the network configura-
tion is locked by the orchestrator which only allows
one change at a time, this approach would reduce
race conditions and conflicts if this system were to
be extended to support multiple simultaneous slice
requests.
4 Conclusion
As highlighted throughout this work, there are use-
cases within network slicing and 5G networks that
would greatly benefit from flexible selection of net-
work encryption. Two such use-cases we demon-
strate in this work are metro-site-hosted enterprise
apps and content delivery networks, however there
are many potential applications such as CAVs (con-
nected and automated vehicles) communications,
smart factories, connecting distributed research fa-
cilities with high-value intellectual property, and
more. Moreover, the dynamic nature of this work
also lends itself to applications with time variable
demand, such as setting-up highly secure links for
daily, or more frequent, back-up of data.
For future-proof security, the secure link options
will need to include quantum-safe methods such as
NTRU (i.e. quantum-resistant algorithms) and QKD
as demonstrated here, such that the customer, or
network operator, are able to select the encryption
level accordingly, based on the type of traffic. The
security requirements of a 5G application can be in-
cluded in the resource selection criteria of a 5G Net-
work Slicing Orchestrator. This approach could help
operators make maximum utilisation of premium
security resources such as high speed, encrypted
links and QKD.
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Figure 7: Histograms showing slice set-up times over 100 runs. a) Use-Case 1 provision times, and b) deprovision times, c) Use-Case 2
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Figure 8: A Wireshark trace showing the complete provision of a network slice.
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